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Abstract According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different
sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged
his own equipollence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege,
little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I
will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these
provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is of
no use for Frege’s purposes. This is connected to what Frege took to be the ‘greatest
difficulty for philosophy’: natural language sentences don’t just express thoughts; they
convey evaluations and communicative hints. Because of this, Frege’s recognition
criterion for thoughts cannot be applied to them and we cannot make logical progress
by ‘recognising a thought in different linguistic guises’.
Keywords Frege · Thoughts · Equipollence · Sameness of sense ·
Difficulties in apprehending contents
1 Introduction
According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences
express the same thought to make progress in logic. Frege hedged his own equipol-
lence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention
has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that
Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without the provisos Frege’s
criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, the criterion is of no
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use for Frege’s purposes. This is connected to what Frege took to be the ‘greatest dif-
ficulty for philosophy’: natural language sentences don’t just express thoughts; they
convey evaluations and communicative hints. Because of this, Frege’s recognition cri-
terion for thoughts cannot be applied to them and we cannot make logical progress by
‘recognising a thought in different linguistic guises’.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, I will outline what a recognition
criterion for sameness of thought expressed is and why Frege held that we need such
a criterion. In Sect. 3, I will introduce and clarify the role of the notion of sentence
content in Frege’s equipollence criterion. It is often noted that there is a tension between
Frege’s criterion andhismetaphysics of thoughts. In Sect. 4, Iwill argue that the tension
is spurious. Sections 5–8 are devoted to the role of the provisos in Frege’s criterion.
2 The need for recognition criterion for sameness of thought expressed
Thoughts, Frege tells us, are those things ‘for which the question of truth arises’.1 The
question of truth, for example, does not arise for the assertoric sentence ‘London is the
largest city in Europe’: it is neither true not false; at best it is true (false) at a time as
a sentence in English. But some assertoric sentences in natural and formal languages
express thoughts. For example, the thought expressed by the sentence ‘London is the
largest city in Europe’ when it is uttered at a certain time can be assessed for truth and
falsity and when we judge we acknowledge the truth of a thought.
Among the sentences that express thoughts, some express the same thought. Frege
argues that it is a substantial task to establishwhich sentences express the same thought.
It is also a task logic must tackle. Why?
Consider an example from Frege’s Begriffsschrift:
(1a) Archimedes perished at the capture of Syracuse.
(1b) The violent death of Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse is a fact.
In 1879, Frege did not yet have the notion of a thought at his disposal but he argued that
(1a) and (1b) have the same judgeable content forwhich the question of truth and falsity
arises. Logic is solely concerned with judgeable contents (thoughts), the relations
between them and the laws that govern them. Hence, if (1a) and (1b) express the
same judgeable content, logic should not distinguish between them. The distinctions
between them are merely grammatical and can be ignored by logic. If we want to
design a language like Frege’s Begriffsschrift—an ideography whose sentences only
express thoughts—it should dispense with grammatical subject and predicate.2
In order to develop a language or script suitable for logic, we need to be able to
recognise whether two different sentences express the same thought. Frege’s example
suggests further that we must be able to recognise the same thought even if it is
expressed by sentences that differ in grammatical form as (S1a) and (S1b) do and that
seem to concern different objects and properties.
1 Frege (1918/9, p. 292 [62]). Page references to German texts are in square brackets.
2 For the question of what a Begriffsschrift is that takes the historical background into account, see Barnes
(2002). I will come back to this in due course. I use ‘Begriffsschrift’ for Frege’s book and ‘Begriffsschrift’
for the ideography developed in the book.
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In order to recognise whether two different sentences express the same thought, we
need a criterion for sameness of thought expressed. Frege is clear about this:
[T]he task of logic can hardly be performed without trying to recognize the
thought in its manifold guises […] (Frege 1892b, pp. 171–172 [195]).
And in a later letter to Husserl, he wrote:
It seems to me that an objective criterion is necessary for a recognising a thought
again as the same, for without it logical analysis is impossible (Frege 1906c, p.
70 [105]).
Frege uses ‘criterion’ in its standard sense. A criterion is a ‘distinguishing mark’.3
A distinguishing mark is a property or relation that allows one to recognise whether
something has a distinct, further property.Aproperty F or relation R is a distinguishing
mark of a distinct property G if one can recognise that something or some things is
(are) F (stand in R) independently of and prior to recognising whether it is (they are)
G and the fact that an object is F (some objects stand in R) indicates that it is (they are)
also G. There are different varieties of indication. For instance, if a mushroom looks
and smells a certain way, it is likely that it is poisonous. However, here we will be
mainly concerned with a criterion that specifies a relation whose holding guarantees
that some sentences express the same thought. The relation specified may also figure
in the identity conditions of thoughts, that is, an answer to the question under which
conditions the thought T1 is the same thought as the thought T2. But it need not do so.
The primary role of the criterion is epistemic: it enables us to recognise whether two
sentences express the same thought or not.
3 Frege’s recognition criterion
In the last section, we saw that Frege needs a criterion for sameness of thought
expressed that allows him to decide whether sentences that differ in structure express
the same thought or not. Frege’s ‘equipollence criterion’ (RecognitionEC) satisfies
this need.4 It is worth quoting the passage in which he introduced the ‘equipollence
criterion’ (RecognitionEC) in full:
[P1] When I use the word ‘sentence’ in what follows, I do not mean [optative,
imperative, interrogative sentences], but assertoric sentences. [….]Now two sen-
3 For instance Grimms Wörterbuch gives ‘Unterscheidungskennzeichen’ for ‘Kriterium’.
4 Frege himself proposed two different recognition criteria. One is framed in terms of provable sameness
of truth-value. See Frege (1906b, pp. 67–69 [105–6]). The problem with this criterion is well-known: the
criterion classifies logically equivalent sentences such as ‘2 + 2 = 4’ and ‘7 + 5 = 12’ as expressing the
same thought. But by Frege’s own light, these sentences express different thoughts. I will therefore set
this criterion aside and focus on the so-called ‘equipollence criterion’ (RecognitionEC). See, for example,
Heijenoort (1977, pp. 105–6), Klement (2002, p. 92ff) and Schellenberg (2012, p. 164f). See Beaney (1996,
p. 228ff) for a discussion of the difference between the criteria. Sander (2016) defends the provability
criterion and takes it to be in harmony with the equipollence criterion if the thinkers that acknowledge
contents are ideal thinkers. I take it that Frege is interested in a criterion that is usable for ordinary thinkers
and will therefore focus on (RecognitionEC).
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tences A and B can stand in such a relation that anyone who acknowledges the
content of A as true must straightaway [acknowledge] the content of B as true
and, conversely, that anyone who [acknowledges] the content of B must imme-
diately [acknowledge] that of A. (Equipollence). [P2] It is here being assumed
that there is no difficulty in apprehending [Auffassung] the contents of A and B.
The sentences need not be equivalent in all respects. […] [P3] I assume there
is nothing in the content of either of the two equipollent sentences A and B that
would have to be immediately acknowledged as true by anyone who grasped it
properly […] (Frege 1906a, p. 213, [197]).5
Frege supplements his criterion with three provisos that I have labelled above as (P1–
P3). We can sum up Frege’s proposal as follows:
Provided that
(P1) S1 and S2 are assertoric sentences,
(P2) there is no difficulty in apprehending the content of S1 and S2,
(P3) there is nothing in the content of S1 and S2 that is obviously true;
(RecognitionEC) the thought that is part of the content of S1 = the thought
that is part of the content of S2
if, and only if,
[one must, if one acknowledges the content of S1 as true, immediately
acknowledge the content of S2 as true (and vice versa)].
It is noteworthy that (RecognitionEC) does not specify a relation between two sen-
tences S1 and S2 but between their contents. This is not merely a careless formulation,
but it is essential that (RecognitionEC) appeals to a relation between the contents of
sentences. In order to see why, consider Beaney’s criticism of Frege’s equipollence
criterion, which he renders as follows:
The sense of the assertoric sentence S1 = the sense of the assertoric sentence S1
if, and only if,
Everyone who recognizes the content of S1 as true, must immediately recognize
the content of S2 as true (and vice versa) (Beaney 1996, p. 229).
He takes this and similar criteria to be ‘useless’:
For if the ‘content’ of a proposition is precisely the ‘thought’ expressed […], then,
if two propositions do express the same thought, to grasp the ‘content’ of one
is ipso facto to grasp the ‘content’ of the other, and if it is the ‘content’ that we
recognize as true or false, thenwe automatically recognize the ‘content’ of one as
true if we recognize the ‘content’ of the other as true. Not only does this make the
5 I have changed the translation.Theoriginal translation ofFrege’s ‘Wunschsätze,Befehlssätze, Fragesätze’
as ‘sentences that serve to express a wish, a wish, or a command’ is misleading. An assertoric sentence can
serve to express a wish or make a command. But Frege wants to distinguish assertoric sentences from these
other kinds of sentences. Hence, we need the grammatical categories of optatives etc. that Frege himself
mentions. Further, Frege uses ‘anerkennen’ which is not correctly translated as ‘accept’. The original
translation has for ‘Auffassung’ ‘grasping’ (fassen). But one grasps thoughts, while Frege uses a distinct
term for the cognitive act we bear towards a content. I translate therefore ‘Auffassung’ as apprehension.
123
Synthese
criterion useless, but it also violates the constraints on an adequate criterion: it is
unacceptable to presuppose on the right hand side of the biconditional precisely
that notion that we are attempting to specify (Beaney 1996, p. 233; emphasis
added).
Frege’s criterion would indeed be useless and circular if the content of a sentence
was the thought expressed. But Beaney’s modus ponens is Frege’s modus tollens. The
content of a sentence is not the thought expressed; the thought is part of the content.
As Frege put it, in ‘The Thought’, ‘the content of a sentence often goes beyond the
thought expressed by it’ (Frege 1918/9, p. 296 [64]).
What is the content of a sentence if it exceeds the thought? The literature on this
topic is vast. But for our purposes, we only need the basic idea that is nicely stated by
Neale:
The phenomena noted by Frege, Grice, and others are, I think, quite natural
once we take into account the nature of communication. We do not seek to
transmit information only about the world; communication may also involve
the transmission of information about our attitudes and emotions […] (Neale
1999, p. 60).
For example, by putting a word into the subject position in a sentence, we express a
thought but also communicate that that referent of the word commands our attention:
In ordinary language, the place of the subject in the sequence of words has
the significance of a distinguished place, where we put that to which we wish
especially to direct the attention of the listener (Frege 1879, p. 12 [3]).
The sentences (1a) and (1b) differ in what occupies the position of the grammatical
subject. When understanding the sentences, the audience will direct their attention to
different expressions and different referents. The content is different but the thought
is the same. Further parts of the content are, for instance, evaluations conveyed by the
words chosen (‘dog’ versus ‘cur’) or additional thoughts.
The content of the sentence contains the thought as well as the information about
our attitudes and evaluations that is conveyed in the way outlined. Roughly speaking,
everything a competent speaker can gather from understanding a particular sentence
and its grammatical form is part of the content. But not everything that one can gather
in this way is relevant for the truth of the content. (RecognitionEC) is supposed to
‘separate off’ the thought that is, properly speaking, true or false from other parts of
the content of a sentence:
[O]ne has to separate off from the content of a sentence the part that can alone
be accepted as true or rejected as false. I call this part the thought expressed by
the sentence. It is the same in equipollent sentences of the kind given above. It
is only with this part of the content that logic is concerned (Frege 1906a, p. 198,
[213–214]).
With this in mind, let’s illustrate the point and purpose of (RecognitionEC).
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(RecognitionEC) allows us to recognise sameness of thought expressed indepen-
dently of the structure of S1 and S2. It allows, to take a limiting case, a one-word
(‘Gavagai’) and amany-word sentence (‘There is a rabbit’) to express the same thought.
It also justifies Frege’s judgements about sameness of thought expressed. For exam-
ple, Frege (1923–6, p. 15 [49–50]) provided some striking examples of sentences that
differ in grammatical form and contain expressions that differ in sense, yet express,
according to (RecognitionEC), the same sense. Consider the following sentences:
(S2a) The earth is a planet.
(S2b) The earth is a planet and the earth is planet.
(S2c) The earth is a planet or the earth is planet.
One cannot understand (S2a) ‘The earth is a planet’ and (S2b) ‘The earth is a planet
and the earth is a planet’ and endorse the first content while rejecting the second.
4 Frege’s recognition criterion, the picture thesis and the Begriffsschrift
According to (RecognitionEC), sentences that are not composed of simple expressions
with the same senses in the same way can express the same thought. Now this seems
to conflict with Frege’s metaphysics of thoughts. For he also held that thoughts are
made up of parts (‘Gedankenbausteine’) in a way that corresponds, by and large, to
the way the sentence expressing the thought is made up of parts:
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it can express an
incalculable number of thoughts, so that even if a thought has been grasped by
an inhabitant of the earth for the first time, a form of words can be found in
which it will be understood by someone else to whom the thought is entirely
new. This would not be possible, if we could not distinguish parts in the thought
corresponding to the parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the sentence can
serve as a picture of the structure of the thought (Frege 1923–6, p. 1 [36]).
I will call the conjunction of the thesis (i) that thoughts contain senses as parts and
(ii) that the parts of thoughts correspond to the parts of the sentence expressing it the
Picture Thesis.6 If the structure of a sentence can serve as a picture of the structure of
the thought it expresses, two sentences S1 and S2 can only express the same thought
if they have the same structure.7 Otherwise, one of them would express the thought
under consideration, yet its structure would not be a picture of the thought expressed.
(RecognitionEC) is incompatible with the Picture Thesis. For example, the thought
expressed by (S2b) seems to contain the sense of ‘and’ not contained in the thought
expressed by (S2a). Hence, the thoughts differ in constituents and the Picture The-
sis pronounces them different, while (RecognitionEC) justifies us in saying that the
thoughts expressed are the same.
6 See Frege (1919, p. 275 [254]); Frege (1923, p. 259 [279]). For further discussion, see Dummett (1981b,
p. 261) and Heck and May (2011, p. 144f).
7 See Dummett (1981a, pp. 378–379). Levine (2002, p. 210ff) argues that Frege is not committed to the
thesis Dummett ascribes to him.
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Is Frege’s theory of thoughts then inconsistent?8 No, for if we look at the Picture
Thesis in other remarks by Frege, we see that we need to take it with a pinch of salt.
To see this, let us have another look at Frege’s reason for the Picture Thesis in the
last quote. Does Frege claim that any language can express an incalculable number
of thoughts with a few syllables? This reading of Frege’s quote about the astonishing
nature of language would make the Picture Thesis plausible. But the reading of the
quote can’t be right if we take into account that, already in 1880/1, Frege had observed
that in natural language, the way concept words are composed out of constituents only
imperfectly matches the way concepts are composed:
The words ‘lifeboat’ and ‘deathbed’ are similarly constructed though the logical
relations among the constituents are different. So the latter isn’t expressed at all,
but is left to guesswork. [Language] often only indicates by inessential marks or
by imagery what a Begriffsschrift should spell out in full (Frege 1880/1, p. 13
[13]).9
The words ‘lifeboat’ and ‘deathbed’ are composed out of words in the same way, yet
the relation between the senses expressed by their constituents is different. A lifeboat
is a boat whose dedicated use is to save lives; a deathbed is not a bed whose dedicated
use is to save deaths. Since the construction of these expressions from parts does not
correspond to the relation between the sense and the reference of the expressions, one
grasps the thought expressed by ‘There is a lifeboat on the beach’ and ‘He was on his
deathbed’, without the combination ‘lifebed’ even having a sense. Such examples are
easily multiplied. The expressions ‘Earl Grey tea’ and ‘breakfast tea’ are constructed
in the sameway out of parts, yet the corresponding complex senses are not constructed
in the same way out of their parts10. Therefore one can grasp the senses of the parts
‘Earl Grey’, ‘tea’ and ‘breakfast’ and their mode of combinationwithout thereby being
able to grasp the complex senses. I might, for instance, grasp the sense of ‘Breakfast
is in the morning’ and the sense of ‘Earl Grey tea is reviving’ without being able
to grasp the sense of ‘Breakfast tea is reviving’. More often than not, knowledge of
how a complex expression is composed out of words, together with knowledge of the
senses of the components, is insufficient to grasp the thought expressed by the complex
expression. Frege anticipated with these observations the contemporary critique of the
8 This alleged tension has sparked a lot of interest in the literature on Frege. Some authors reject the Picture
Thesis and want to preserve (RecognitionEC) (see, for example, Bell (1996, pp. 595–596) and Kemmerling
(1990, 2011). Thoughts, they say, have no parts; they have parts relative to a sentence. Others hold on to
the Picture Thesis and, in turn, reject (RecognitionEC): two sentences can only express the same thought if
they ‘involve’ the same senses (see, for example, Dummett’s principle K in his 1988, 1 and Künne (2004,
pp. 47–48). Since (S2b) ‘involves’ the concept of conjunction and (S2a) doesn’t, (S2a) and (S2c) don’t
express the same thought. Neither response is entirely satisfactory. Penco (2003) takes Frege, therefore, to
operate with two different conceptions of sense. I outline a third response above.
9 Frege’s example is ‘Berggipfel’ and ‘Baumriese’. The original translation gives ‘Sprache’ as ‘Speech’.
This suggests that the problem concerns only spoken words. This suggestion is misleading and should be
resisted. I have therefore changed the translation.
10 Thanks to Jessica Leech for suggesting this example.
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view that the sense of a complex expression is constructed from the sense of its parts
according to grammatically encoded forms of construction.11
Frege’s examples make it plausible that, more often than not, the structure of a
sentence of natural language is not a picture of the structure of the thought expressed
(if a thought is expressed at all). Hence, in order to grasp the sense of a complex
expression, it is often necessary to know the senses of its parts, themodeof combination
and, as Frege put it in the last quote, make guesses. This is not a problem: we can
easily guess which thought is expressed by an utterance of such a sentence because we
can rely on common knowledge, tacit conventions and contextual clues. He goes on
to repeat again and again that ‘our everyday language leave a good deal to guesswork’
(Frege 1914, p. 230 [213]).12
In contrast, a Begriffsschrift shall express thoughts in such a way that the construc-
tion of complex expressions from parts mirrors the construction of their senses and
thereby makes such guesses superfluous. This feature of a Begriffsschrift is part and
parcel of the conception of a Begriffsschrift.13 The authors before Frege who worked
on the development of a Begriffsschrift held that it is a necessary condition for a script
to be a Begriffsschrift that it satisfies the Picture Thesis. Barnes (2002, p. 78) quotes
Krug, who says that an ideography is a pasigraphy if
it is a truly universal language (a lingua characteristica universalis), i.e. a script
which expresses, in a universal intelligible fashion, not only concepts but also
connexions and relations, and further all their possible modes of combination in
judgements or propositions (Krug 1832-38 II, pp. 500–501).
In this sense, Frege’sBegriffsschrift is not only an ideography, but a pasigraphybecause
its signs express concepts and the combinations of the signs are pictures of combi-
nations of the concepts they express. Frege’s Begriffsschrift is designed to satisfy the
Picture Thesis. In § 32 of Basic Laws of Arithmetic, after taking the reader through
the construction of truth-value names from names of objects and function expressions,
Frege can correctly say that if a Begriffsschrift name ‘n’ is part of a truth-value name,
the sense of ‘n’ is part of the sense of the truth-value name14. Hence, if one knows how
aBegriffsschrift sentence is constructed from signs and knows themethod of construc-
tion, one grasps the thought expressed. No guesswork is necessary and therefore no
unwanted assumptions can be smuggled in when we prove a truth in Begriffsschrift.
While such assumptions are unwanted when proving mathematical truths, they are
frequently made and largely harmless in natural language communication.
So we need to take Frege’s remark about what language can do with a pinch of
salt. In a language in which the logical relation between senses and concepts is fully
expressed and never merely hinted at, the structure of the sentence will mirror the
11 See Recanati (2004, p.131ff) and the works cited there.
12 In an undated letter to Peano, Frege goes even as far as saying that the sentences of natural language
don’t need to be composed out of words that have sense and reference on their own if these sentences are
essentially vehicles of communication. See PMC, 115; BW, pp. 182–183.
13 SeeBarnes (2002). Frege is aware ofLeibniz’s andTrendelenburg’s projects to developBegriffsschriften.
See, for example, Frege 1880/1, pp. 9–10 [9–10].
14 See Frege 1893, p. 51 [51]
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structure of the thought expressed. Languages like English only approximate such
a language. More often than not, we need to guess which thought is expressed by a
sentence of such a language. Hence, the Picture Thesis is, in general, not true of natural
language sentences. For this reason, we are not entitled to assume that the way natural
language sentences are built up from (simple) expressions mirrors or is even a good
guide to the way the thought expressed is built up from senses.
At the same time, we need to start from natural language to develop a Begriffsschrift
that fully expresses what many natural sentences only hint at. This constitutes, Frege
argued, the greatest difficulty for philosophy:
Just here I see the greatest difficulty for philosophy: the instrument it finds
available for its work, namely ordinary language, is little suited to the purpose,
its formation having been governed by requirements wholly different from those
of philosophy. So also logic is first of all obliged to fashion a useable instrument
from those already to hand. And for this purpose it initially finds but little in the
way of useable instruments available (Frege 1923–6, p. 11 [45]).
We can only start to develop a Begriffsschrift or any other kind of symbolism for the
expression of thoughts if we can separate merely grammatical features of sentences
from logical ones. For this task, we need a criterion that allows us to ‘detect’ whether
sentences express the same thought or not, independently of whether the sentences
differ in structure. For, as we have seen, when it comes to natural language sentences,
we are not justified in taking a difference in structure to suffice for a difference in
sense. Frege’s recognition criterion (RecognitionEC) seems to be a good candidate
for themark of sameness of thought expressed that Frege needs. There is, then, no clash
between the Picture Thesis and (RecognitionEC): Frege employs (RecognitionEC) to
develop a script for which the Picture Thesis is true and he needs to employ (Recogni-
tionEC) because the languages in use only approximate a Begriffsschrift. If we have
developed such a script, we are entitled to hold the Picture Thesis with respect to its
sentences (formulae). Even if we have such a script, wewill still need (RecognitionEC)
to regiment and translate sentences into it.
In the following sections, I will look more closely at (RecognitionEC). I will set
aside the problemwith obvious truths to which (proviso3) responds aside and focus on
sentences whose wording expresses a thought; that is, I will not discuss sentences with
indexical and demonstratives. In the following sections, I will discuss the problems
that arise in connection with (proviso1) and (proviso2). (Proviso2) will lead to a
fundamental problem for Frege’s philosophy.
5 The ‘Assertoric sentence’ proviso
Prima facie, (proviso1) is unproblematic. Thoughts are supposed to be the senses
expressed by assertoric sentences. Hence, (proviso1) simply narrows the range of
application to the only kind of sentence that Frege takes to express thoughts. But (pro-
viso1) is for internal reasons problematic. To see this, let’s go back to Begriffsschrift:
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We can imagine a language inwhich the proposition “Archimedes perished at the
capture of Syracuse”would be expressed thus: “The violent death ofArchimedes
at the capture of Syracuse is a fact”. To be sure, one can distinguish between
subject and predicate here, too, if onewishes to do so, but the subject contains the
whole content, and the predicate serves only to turn the content into a judgement
(Frege 1879, p. 12 [3–4]; emphasis added).
The subject of
(1b) The violent death of Archimedes at the conquest of Syracuse is a fact
is the singular term ‘The violent death of Archimedes at the conquest of Syracuse’. In
Frege’s Begriffsschrift, ‘[t]he entire specific content of a sentence is localized within
a component singular term’ (Rumfitt 2011, p. 7). The predicates ‘is a fact’ or ‘is true’
don’t contribute to the content of (1b). While Frege will change his view about the
role of the predicate ‘is true’, he will maintain that sentence-nominalisations express
thoughts:
If I attach theword ‘salty’ to theword ‘sea-water’ as a predicate, I form a sentence
that expresses a thought. To make it clearer that we have only the expression of a
thought, but that nothing is meant to be asserted, I put the sentence in dependent
form ‘that sea-water is salty’ (Frege 1915, p. 217 [251]).
The that-clause ‘that sea-water is salty’ is obviously not an assertoric sentence. But if
it only expresses a thought, it expresses a thought.
No criterion of content-identity that is prefixed by (proviso1) can be used to decide
whether Frege is right or wrong about the content of ‘The violent death of Archimedes
at the conquest of Syracuse’, etc. For ‘The violent death of Archimedes at the con-
quest of Syracuse’ is not an assertoric sentence. In order to justify a central claim of
Begriffsschrift, Frege needs to be able to detect sameness of thought across grammat-
ical categories; and (proviso1) makes this impossible.
6 The ‘Not difficult to apprehend’ Proviso and psychological limitations
(Proviso2) may seem like a mere unimportant aside. But, as I will now argue, it is
not. We first need to ask how one ought to understand (proviso2): which contents are
difficult to apprehend and why? In this section, I will look at Frege’s suggestion that
a content may be difficult to grasp because of our psychological limitations.
Frege writes:
We simply do not have the mental capacity to hold before our minds a very
complex logical structure so that it is equally clear to us in every detail. For
instance, what man, when he uses the word ‘integral’ in proof, ever has clearly
before him everything that appertains to the sense of the word! (Frege 1914, p.
222 [240]; in part my translation.)
If the thought that is part of the content of the assertoric sentence S1 and the thought that
is part of the content of the assertoric sentence S2 are the same, but at least one of them
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is not clearly grasped, one can accept the content of S1 without eo ipso accepting the
content of S2 and without incurring blame or criticism for being irrational. Complex
senses are difficult to grasp for us and if a part of a content is difficult to grasp, the
whole content will be difficult to grasp. Hence, we need to add to (EC) the proviso
about ‘no difficulty in apprehending a content’. When are the conditions for applying
(proviso2) satisfied? Frege said little about unclearly grasping senses:
we do not have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign, but that its outlines
are confused as if we saw it through a mist. The effect of the logical analysis will
then exactly be this—to articulate the sense clearly (Frege 1914, p. 211 [228]).
We have a clear grasp if we can articulate the sense clearly; we have an unclear grasp
if we can’t. This is of little help in applying (proviso2). For we have no independent
grip on an incomplete grasp and therefore cannot know whether (proviso2) is satisfied
or not. We have an unexplained distinction between a clear and an unclear grasp and
no guide for applying it.
Burge tries to help Frege out by connecting clear grasp with ideal theory:
The senses of expressions could be fully grasped only by grasping equivalences
given by ideal scientific explications, or by otherwise understanding the contri-
bution of those expressions to a theory. Of course, since most of the envisioned
ideal explications would come as discoveries, it is possible to doubt them (even
if the doubt depends on less than full analytic mastery of the senses), while no
doubting the corresponding self-identities. So by Frege’s test for the identity of
senses, the senses of the explicans and explicandum would be different (Burge
1990, p. 265, Fn. 16).
However, Frege should reject Burge’s help. Frege is concerned with a lack of mental
power that prevents us from grasping the sense of some words fully. My cognitive
deficiency in fully grasping the sense of, say, ‘number’ is not addressed by the devel-
opment of ideal arithmetic, but by removing psychological barriers.
Schellenberg (2012, p. 168) has a different take on the complexity reading of ‘easily
graspable’. She says:
The qualification “where the content of both A and B is easily graspable” con-
strains the applicability of the criterion to exclude complex sentences. With a
complex sentence, I mean a sentence that is not easily graspable (Schellenberg
2012, p. 168).
This sounds empty. But, charitably construed, Schellenberg has the following problem
in mind. Consider for illustration the sentence pair:
(3a) 2 + 2 = 4.
(3b) It is not the case that it is not the case that 2 + 2 = 4.
(3a) and (3b) may express the same thought. I may nonetheless assent to what (3a)
says, but not immediately to what (3b) says, because it takes time to parse (3b).
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Schellenberg proposes finessing this problem by replacing ‘immediate acknowl-
edgement’ in Frege’s criterion with ‘rational commitment’:
Two sentences S1 and S2 have the same sense iff
(i) anyone who understands S1 and S2 and takes S1 to have a certain truth-value
is rationally committed to recognize that S2 has the same truth-value as S1 and
vice versa;
(ii) the understanding of S1 is constitutively connected to the understanding of S2
and vice versa (Schellenberg 2012, p. 170).
Schellenberg does not explain ‘rational commitment’ further. But the examples she
gives suggest that a speaker’s taking S1 to have a certain truth-value rationally commits
her to recognising that S2 has the same truth-value if, and only if, S ought to recognize
that S2 is true (false) if she has accepted S1 as true (false).15 She may be excused in
various ways for not living up to this demand—she was not thinking carefully, was
distracted, the command of a word was shaky—yet the demand applies to her. More
needs to be said about the force of this ‘ought’, but for our purposes these remarks
will suffice.
Does the appeal to ‘rational commitment’ help Frege? No, for now sentences turn
out to express the same thought that, by Frege’s own light, should express different
thoughts. Consider
(4a) 2+ 1+ 3 = 2 + 1 + 3
(4b) 2 + 1+ 3 = 1 + 1+ 1 +1 +1 +1
If one understands and accepts (4b), one can extend one’s knowledge of arithmetic,
while one cannot extend one’s arithmetical knowledge by accepting (4a). Hence, these
sentences ought to express different thoughts. But if one understands (4a) and (4b)
and takes (4a) to be true, one is rationally committed to taking (4b) to be true (and vice
versa). One ought to acknowledge the truth of (4b) if one has acknowledged the truth
of (4a), whether one has worked out that they have necessarily the same truth-value
or not. Is one’s understanding of (4a) constitutively connected to (4b) and vice versa?
This question is difficult to answer because Schellenberg does not give the reader a
good grip on the constitutive connection she has in mind. But it seems plausible to say
that it is not possible to understand (4a) without understanding (4b) and vice versa.
After all, they contain the same numerals and arithmetical symbols or numerals that
can be defined in terms of each other. Hence, Schellenberg’s recognition criterion
makes (4a) and (4b) express the same thought. This is an unwanted consequence; the
criterion overgeneralises.
A general problem for Frege starts to emerge: if we want to recognise the same
thought in different linguistic guises, we need to be able to tell whether the non-
immediacy of recognising the sameness of truth-value of two sentences S1 and S2 is
due to difficulties in grasping the content of these sentences or not. If I acknowledge
the truth of the content of S1 without immediately acknowledging the truth of S2, is this
due to the fact that a separate act of judgement is required and the thoughts expressed
are different or because at least one of the contents is not easy to apprehend?
15 See Schellenberg (2012, p. 171).
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Frege did not answer this question, but simply excluded sentences whose content is
not easy to apprehend by adding (proviso2). Thismove severely restricts the usefulness
of the criterion. It does not allow us, for example, to decide whether a complex tau-
tology and a simple sentence express the same thought. Schellenberg tried to preserve
the applicability of the criterion by framing it without the proviso. Yet the proposal
turned out to be implausible.
In the next section, I will argue that this problem arises independently of the com-
plexity of the sentences under consideration. The problem is pervasive and makes
Frege’s criterion useless.
7 Thought’s wrapping
If two simple sentences S1 and S2 express the thought P and something else, it is
possible that a speaker will grasp P , yet while she acknowledges the content of S1 as
true, she might not immediately acknowledge the content of S2 as true. The reason
for this is that the speaker does not distinguish between the thought P and other parts
of the content. Frege took the described possibility to be actual. The sentences of the
language we use express thoughts in disguised form. For example, he wrote in the
introduction to Begriffsschrift:
If it is one of the tasks of philosophy to break the domination of the word
over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of
language almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts
by freeing the thought from that with which only the means of expression of
ordinary language, constituted as they are, saddle it, then my ideography, further
developed for these purposes, can become a useful tool for the philosopher (Frege
1879, p. 7 [vi–vii]).
Frege notes that a Begriffsschrift will not achieve pure expression, but only limit the
‘damage’ done by expressing a thought to a minimum.
The same idea can be found at the beginning of Foundations of Arithmetic. There,
he characterises logical progress as follows:
Often it is only after immense intellectual effort, which may have continued over
centuries, that humanity at last succeeds in achieving knowledge of a concept in
its pure form, in stripping off the irrelevant accretions [fremden Umhüllungen]
which veil it from the eyes of the mind (Frege 1884, p. xix).
Austin translated Frege’s ‘fremde Umhüllungen’ as ‘irrelevant accretions’. This is
unfortunate. For example, Frege’s ‘Logik (1897)’ has a section called ‘Trennung des
Gedankens von denUmhüllungen’ which is translated in Frege’sPosthumous Writings
(138) as ‘Separating a Thought from its Trappings’. A better translation that captures
themeaning of ‘Umhüllungen’ is ‘wrappings’. A content or thought can bewrapped up
in such away that it is hard to recognise. Onemakes progress in logic by distinguishing
the wrapping of the thought from the thought itself. If we have managed to free the
thought from its wrapping, we express it in pure form.
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The most detailed discussion of the opposition between expressing a thought in
pure form and in disguised or wrapped up form can be found in the section of ‘Logik
(1897)’ just mentioned. Here, Frege uses an analogy between chemistry and logic to
make his point. A chemist might be faced with the practical question of establishing
whether two samples are samples of the same substance. He might have a test for
doing so, say, testing how each sample responds to litmus paper. But the test will only
work if the samples are pure. If the samples are contaminated, that is, if they contain
other substances, samples of different substances may pass the test or samples of the
same substance may fail it. Hence, the test can only be applied to pure samples. The
same goes for thoughts:
The purity of the object of one’s investigation is not just important for the chemist.
How should he be able to securely recognize that he arrived by different routes
at the same result if the difference might have its ground in impurities of the
applied substances? (Frege 1897, pp. 141–142 [153].)
Just as two impure samples of the same substance may fail the sameness test, two
sentences that express the same thought, but impurely, may not be detected by Frege’s
criterion for sameness of thought expressed. So the logician has to require the objects
of investigation to be presented in pure form:
[The first and most important task is to set out the objects of investigation in
pure form]. Only by means of this is one able to make the acts of recognition
that probably constitute the fundamental discoveries in logic, too. Therefore let
us never forget that two different sentences can express the same thought, that
we are only concerned with only that part of the sentence’s content which can
be true or false (Frege 1897, p. 143 [154]; in part my translation).16
In pure form, a thought is purged of impurities. What are the impurities Frege has
in mind? Many grammatical features of natural language count, by Frege’s light,
as ‘contaminating’ the expression of a thought. In Begriffsschrift, Frege lists such
features. By stressing a phrase or word, we draw our audience’s attention to this part
of a sentence. We can stress an expression in different ways: by intonation or by
putting the expression in a distinguished position in the sentence we use.17 Changes
in word-order that put a word or phrase into the subject position direct the attention
of the audience, but, argued Frege, do not change the thought expressed:
Whereupon the attention is directed, what is stressed, can otherwise be very
important but does not concern logic (Frege 1897, p. 141 [153]; my translation).
And:
16 In Posthumous Writings, Frege’s ‘Die erste und wichtigste Aufgabe ist, die Gegenstände der Unter-
suchung rein darzustellen’ is translated as ‘The first and most important task is to set out clearly what
the objects of investigation are’ (143). This is a significant mistranslation. Frege is concerned with the
purity (rein darzustellen), not with clarity. The translation makes Frege’s use of the ‘purity’ metaphor
unrecognisable.
17 See Hofweber (2007, p. 12).
123
Synthese
Naturally such transformations are not indifferent in every respect; but they do
not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true or false. If the inadmis-
sibility of such transformations were generally admitted then all deeper logical
investigation would be hindered (Frege 1918/9, p. 296 [64]; emphasis added).
For illustration, consider (S1a) and (S1b) again. (S1b) is a case where a whole sentence
is in focus:
(1a) Archimedes perished at the capture of Syracuse.
(1b) The violent death of Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse is a fact.
The focus effect is achieved by nominalising (1a), putting the nominalised sentence
in the subject position and adding ‘is a fact’ as the grammatical predicate to make a
sentence. Consider the question ‘Is it a fact or is it merely probable that Archimedes
perished at the capture of Syracuse?’ Answering with (1b) stresses ‘The violent death
of Archimedes at the capture of Syracuse’. While Frege takes ‘is true’ to create a focus
effect and nothing more, Ramsey has ‘It is true that’ in mind:
[I]t is evident that “It is true that Caesar was murdered” means no more than
that Caesar was murdered, and “It is false that Caesar was murdered” means no
more than that Caesar was not murdered. They are phrases which we sometimes
use for emphasis or for stylistic reasons, or to indicate the position occupied by
the statement in our argument (Ramsey 1927, p. 157; my emphasis).
Central examples of sentences that Frege takes to express the same thought are ones
in which the focus is changed.18 Consider a further example:
(5a) There is at least one square root of 4.
(5b) The number 4 has the property that there is something whose square it is.
(5c) The concept square root of 4 is realised.
(Frege 1892b, p. 174 [199–200].)
For Frege, (5a–c) express the same thought. If (5a–c) are different ways of expressing
the same thought, they all have the same truth-value. However, in (5c) ‘the concept
square root of 4’ does not refer to a concept, but to an object of a special kind that is
related to the concept referred to by the predicate ‘ξ is a square root of 4’:
The sentence ‘there is at least one square root of 4’, we have an assertion, not
about (say) the definite number 2, nor about −2, but about a concept, square
root of 4; viz., that it is not empty. But if I express the same thought thus: ‘The
concept square root of 4 is realized’, then the first six words form the proper
name of an object, and it is about this object that something is asserted. (Ibid,
1892b, p. 174 [199])
Frege does not say much about the special kind of objects that correspond or represent
concepts.19 But (5c) is true if, and only if, the object referred to by ‘the concept square
18 ‘represents’ is Parsons’s (1986, p. 52) term. Burge (1984, pp. 283–284) speculates that the object of a
special kind are the extensions of the concept.
19 See Parsons (1986, pp. 52–53).
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root of 4’ falls under the first-level concept referred to by ‘ξ is realized’.20 Only objects
of ‘the special kind’ can fall under this concept.
The difference between (5a), (5b), and (5c) concerns which expression or phrase
is in the subject position and thereby in focus. In (5b), ‘4’ is in the subject position
and thereby in focus; in (5a), it is not in focus; in (5c), ‘square root of 4’ has been
nominalised by combining itwith ‘the concept’ and the newexpression has beenmoved
into the subject position. In fact Frege talks as if (5a–5c) are the same sentence:
lt need not then surprise us that the same sentence may be conceived as an
assertion about a concept and also as an assertion about an object; only we must
observe that what is asserted is different. (1892b, p. 175 [200])
The fact that (5a–5c) have different grammatical subjects and predicates changes their
content; they predicate different concepts of different things. This difference in content
masks that the same thought is expressed:
We shall have no truck with the expressions ‘subject’ and predicate’ of which
logicians are so fond, especially since they not only make it more difficult for us
to recognize the same as the same, but also conceal distinctions that are there
(Frege 1897, p. 143 [155], my emphasis).
Seeing a sentence as containing subject and predicate makes it difficult to realise
that it shares its senses with sentences of other form. Here we have, then, the most
fundamental kind of difficulty in apprehending contents that affects our ability to
detect sameness of sense.21
8 ‘The greatest difficulty for philosophy’
Frege made a good case that such examples involve a change of focus that makes
the thought difficult to detect. However, he also assumed that the same thought is
expressed and that the examples only involve a change of focus. Can he justify this
assumption by relying on (EC)? No, for if we apply (EC), (5a) and (5b) will come out
as expressing different thoughts. I may grasp the content expressed by (5a) and (5b)
and take the content expressed by (5a) to be true, but I will not immediately take the
content expressed by (5b) to be true. It takes reflection and some reasoning to work
out that (5b) is true if, and only if, (5a) is true. Hence, (EC) will tell us that (5a) and
(5b) express contents that contain different thoughts. This conclusion generalises for
similar sentence-pairs. A further problem concerns (5c). According to Frege, concepts
cannot be designated by singular terms. They are essentially predicative and their
20 See Hofweber (2007, p.23). Hofweber argues that many sentence-pairs with which Frege is concerned
are distinguished in terms of focus.
21 Formal languages like the language of first-order predicate logic do not contain ambiguous and context-
dependent expressions and structural ambiguities are resolved by brackets, etc. A formal language of this
kind is still no Begriffsschrift in which only thoughts are expressed. For example, the mere order in which
expressions are written on paper can make the content of a sentence richer than the thought expressed.
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designations cannot be in subject-position.22 But in (5c), ‘the concept square root
of 4’ is in the subject position. This expression refers to an object; but the sentence
seems false to us for ‘the concept square root of 4’ seems to refer to a concept. Hence,
the grammatical transformation not only changes the focus of the sentence; it takes
us from a sentence that expresses a true thought to one that seems to express a false
thought.23 This puts pressure on the idea that grammatical transformations that affect
focus leave the thought unchanged.
We don’t need to accept Frege’s view about concept designation to put pressure
on his view that grammatical transformations concerning focus leave the thought
untouched. Consider the sentence ‘3 + 5 = 8’.24 We can transform it into ‘8 is the result
of adding 3 to 5’ and ‘3 is what when added to 5 makes 8’ by putting ‘8’ and then ‘3’
in the subject position. Is it possible to apprehend the content of these sentences and
accept the content, of ‘8 is the result of adding 3 to 5’ without immediately accepting
‘3 is what when added to 5 makes 8’? Yes, it is. You might accept what ‘8 is the result
of adding 3 to 5’ says without eo ipso accepting what ‘3 is what when added to 5
makes 8’ because you have learned that 3 + 5 makes 8, but you don’t yet know what
has to be added to 5 to make 8. You need to work out that the second content is true
by subtracting 5 from 8, a different process from the one that lead to assent to what
‘8 is the result of adding 3 to 5’ says. Hence, application of (EC) yields the result that
the thoughts expressed are different. Yet the only difference between the sentences
concerns which expression is in the subject position and thereby in focus. Frege can
always blame this result on a difficulty in apprehending the content of sentences. But
thenwe have no criterion at all by which to decide the question of whether they express
the same thought or not.
Frege is therefore in a difficult position: we need to make sure that a grammatical
transformation only affects the focus. Butwe cannot use (EC) to ensure that the thought
expressed is the same. Frege exhorted us that ‘we must not let ourselves be seduced
by adhering impurities to see distinctions where none are’ (Frege 1897, p. 142 [154]).
However, if thoughts are expressed in impure form, we can no longer apply (EC) to
distinguish the thought from the impurities. For the difference in grammatical form
interferes with our disposition to immediately accept the content of one sentence if
we accept the content of another.
One can sum Frege’s problem up as follows: If we have ‘set out’ thoughts in pure
form, that is, expressed only the thought and not additional clues, etc. that guide the
audience, (EC) can be applied. But in order to set out a thought in pure form, we
22 See 1892b, p. 172 [197].
23 See Picardi (1993, p. 77). See also Glanzberg (2005, section II.1), for examples in which a change of
focus seems to change truth-conditions. These examples involve adverbs of quantification or modality.
24 I take this example from Stout (2010, p. 396ff); see also the references there. On the basis of the
example, he comes to the opposite conclusion: ‘We could also apply Frege’s test for the distinctness of
two thoughts – whether it is possible to grasp both but have different attitudes to each. Is it possible for
Rebecca to know that what 3 + 5 makes is 8 without knowing that what when added to 5 makes 8 is 3, while
grasping both thoughts? I think it is not possible’ (Stout 2010, p. 398; emphasis added). Stout comes to the
opposite conclusion because he misconstrues Frege’s criterion. Frege’s criterion concerns apprehending the
content of assertoric sentences, not grasping two thoughts and assessing whether one can know one without
knowing the other. Otherwise, the criterion would be open to the problems discussed by Beaney.
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need to have prior knowledge of which assertoric sentences express this thought and
which sentences express the same thought. Only then can we express the thought
in pure form, that is, regiment the sentences that express the same thought in the
same way and disregard their grammatical differences. However, to do so we need
to apply a criterion to recognise the same thought expressed in impure form. But
(EC) cannot be applied to such sentences. The fact that we express the thought in a
natural language sentencewith its grammatical peculiarities and a particular intonation
makes the thought and thereby the content difficult to apprehend. Given (proviso2),
(EC) cannot be used to identify the same thought in different sentences whose content
is difficult to apprehend. There is no other criterion available that can be taken to be a
criterion of thought recognition. Hence, Frege cannot recognise the same thought in
different guises.
Frege is caught in a vicious circle: in order to apply his criterion of thought recog-
nition to assertoric sentences, these sentences need to express thoughts in pure form.
But natural language sentences express thoughts only in impure form; and yet they
are the only possible starting point to develop sentences that express thoughts in pure
form. In order to regiment natural language sentences in such a way that they express
thoughts in pure form, we need to have already applied a criterion of thought recog-
nition to detect sentences that express the same thought, recognise mere grammatical
difference and improve our regimentation accordingly. And this is what Frege tells us
we can’t do. We need to present the thoughts in pure form first.
If logic can only free our thinking from language by relying on a criterion of thought
recognition, we will forever be ruled by language. We can’t make progress in logic by
recognising a thought in its manifold guises. Frege was right to think that the fact that
natural language sentences express more than just thoughts and are not suited for the
purposes of logic poses the ‘greatest difficulty for philosophy’. However, he provided
no answer to this difficulty. The provisos to (RecognitionEC) make the difficulty hard
to spot; they don’t solve it.25
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Barnes, J. (2002). What is a Begriffsschrift? Dialectica, 56, 65–80.
Beaney, M. (1996). Frege: Making sense. London: Duckworth.
Bell, D. (1996). The formation of concepts and the structure of thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 56, 583–597.
25 This paper is based on a talk I gave at the workshop Frege@ Sterling Workshop III: Sense-Identity and
the Status of Definitions in Frege in June 2015. I am grateful to the audience for feedback. Special thanks go
to Mike Beaney, Philip Ebert, Robin Jeshion, Colin Johnston, Walter Pedriali, William Taschek and Crispin
Wright. Many thanks go to Keith Hossack, Nils Kürbis, Jessica Leech, Guy Longworth, Eliot Michaelson
and Ian Rumfitt for comments and criticism. I am grateful to Bob Hale for written comments on a previous
version. My thanks go also to the referees for feedback.
123
Synthese
Burge, T. (1984). Frege on the extension of concepts, from 1884 to 1903. The Philosophical Review, 93,
3–34. Quoted after the reprint in Burge 2005, 273–299.
Burge, T. (1990). Frege on sense and linguistic meaning. In D. Bell & N. Cooper (Eds.), The analytic
tradition (pp. 30–60). Oxford: Blackwell. Quoted after the reprint in Burge 2005, 242–271.
Burge, T. (2005). Truth, thought and reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dummett, M. (1981a). Frege: Philosophy of language (2nd ed.). London: Duckworth.
Dummett, M. (1981b). The interpretation of Frege’s philosophy. London: Duckworth.
Dummett, M. (1988). More about thoughts. Notre Dame Journal of Philosophical Logic, 30, 1–19.
Frege, G. (1879).Begriffsschrift: Eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens.
Reprint in Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, Third Edition, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft 1977, pp. I–VIII, pp. 1–89. Trans. as Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language, Modelled Upon
that of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought by S. Bauer Mengelberg in J. Van Heijenoort (ed.) From Frege
to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1967, 1–82.
Frege, G. (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den
Begriff der Zahl. Hamburg, Meiner 1986. Transl. as The Foundations of Arithmetic. A logico-
mathematical enquiry into the concept of number by John L. Austin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Revised
edition 1953.
Frege, G. (1892a). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100,
25–50. Transl. as ‘On Sense and Meaning’, in McGuiness 1984, 157–77.
Frege, G. (1892b). Über Begriff und Gegenstand. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16,
192–205. Translated as ‘On Concept and Object’ by M. Black and P.T. Geach as ‘On Concept and
Object’. Mind, 60 (1951), 168–180.
Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I. Jena: H. Pohle. Transl. as Basic Laws of Arithmetic
by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg. (137–64). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frege, G. (1897). Logik 1897. Nachgelassene Schriften, Transl. as ‘Logic 1897’ in Posthumous writings,
(203–250).
Frege, G. (1906a). Kurze Übersicht über meine logischen Lehren. Nachgelassene Schriften, (213–218).
Transl. as ‘A brief survey of my logical doctrines’ in Posthumous writings, (197–202).
Frege, G. (1906b). Letter to Husserl (30.10–1.11). Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (101–105). Transl. in
Philosophical and mathematical correspondence, (66–70).
Frege, G. (1906c.) Letter to Husserl (9.12). Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel (105–107). Transl. in Philo-
sophical and mathematical correspondence, (70–71).
Frege, G. (1914). Logik in der Mathematik. Nachgelassene Schriften, (219–270). Transl. as ‘Logic in
mathematics’ in Posthumous writings (203–250).
Frege, G. (1915). Meine grundlegenden logischen Einsichten. Nachgelassene Schriften (271–272). Transl.
as ‘My basic logical insights’ in Posthumous writings (251–252).
Frege,G. (1918/9). DerGedanke.Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus (vol. I, 58–77). Transl.
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry by A.M and Marcelle Quinton in: Mind 65 (1959), 289–311.
Frege, G. (1919). Aufzeichnungen für LudwigDarmstaedter.Nachgelassene Schriften (273–278), Hamburg
1983. Transl. as “Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter”, in Posthumous writings
Frege, G. (1923). Logische Allgemeinheit. Nachgelassene Schriften (278–82). Transl. as ‘Logical Gener-
ality’ in Posthumous Writings (258–63).
Frege, G. (1923–6). Gedankengefüge. Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus (253–258), (vol.
3, 36–51). Translated by R. H. Stoothoff as ‘Compound thoughts’. Mind, 72(1963), 1–17.
Frege,G. (1880/1). Booles rechnendeLogik und dieBegriffsschrift.Nachgelassene Schriften (9–53). Transl.
as ‘Boole’s logical Calculus and the Concept-script in Posthumous Writings (9–47).
Gabriel, Gottfried et al (eds.) (1976). Gottlob Freges Briefwechsel. Hamburg: Meiner. (BW) Abridged
by Brian McGuinness and trans. by Hans Kaal as Philosophical and mathematical correspondence
(PMC) Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980.
Glanzberg, M. (2005). Focus: A study on the semantics–pragmatics boundary. In Z. Szabó-Gendler (Ed.),
Semantics versus pragmatics (pp. 72–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heck, R., & May, R. (2011). The composition of thoughts. Noûs, 45, 126–166.
Hermes, H., et al. (eds.) (1983): Nachgelassene Schriften. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag. (NS) Trans. by Peter
Long and Roger White as Posthumous writings (PW), Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1979.
Hofweber, T. (2007). Innocent statements and their metaphysically loaded counter-parts. Philosophers’
Imprint, 7, 1–33.
123
Synthese
Kemmerling, A. (1990). Gedanken und Ihre Teile. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 37, 1–30.
Kemmerling, A. (2011). Thoughts without parts: Frege’s doctrine. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82,
165–188.
Klement, K. C. (2002). Frege and the logic of sense and reference. New York: Routledge.
Krug, W.T. (ed.) (1832–38). Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften Nebst ihrer
Literatur und Geschichte. Zweite, verbesserte und vermehrte, Auflage. Brockhaus: Leipzig.
Künne, W. (2004). Conceptions of truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levine, J. (2002). Analysis and decomposition in Frege and Russell. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52,
195–216.
McGuiness, B. (Ed.). (1984). Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Neale, S. (1999). Colouring and composition. In R. Stainton (Ed.), Philosophy and linguistics (pp. 35–82).
Boulder: Westview Press.
Parsons, T. (1986). Why Frege should not have said “The concept horse is not a concept”. History of
Philosophy Quarterly, 3, 449–465.
Penco, C. (2003). Two theses, two senses. History and Philosophy of Logic, 24, 87–109.
Picardi, E. (1993). A note on dummett and Frege on sense-identity. European Journal of Philosophy, 1,
69–80.
Ramsey, F. P. (1927). On facts and propositions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7, 153–170.
Recanati, F. (2004). Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rumfitt, I. (2011). Truth and the determination of content: Variation on themes from Frege’s Logische
Untersuchungen. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82, 3–49.
Sander, T. (2016). Freges Kriterien der Sinngleichheit. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 98, 395–432.
Schellenberg, S. (2012). Sameness of Fregean sense. Synthese, 189(163–75), 392–402.
Stout, R. (2010). What you know when you know an answer to a question? Noûs, 44, 392–402.
Van Heijenoort, J. (1977). Frege on sense identity. Journal for Philosophical Logic, 6, 103–108.
123
